Secure SWIPT for Directional Modulation Aided AF Relaying Networks by Zhou, Xiaobo et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
3.
05
27
8v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  1
4 M
ar 
20
18
1
Secure SWIPT for Directional Modulation Aided
AF Relaying Networks
Xiaobo Zhou, Jun Li, Feng Shu, Qingqing Wu, Yongpeng Wu, Wen Chen, and Hanzo Lajos
Abstract—Secure wireless information and power transfer
based on directional modulation is conceived for amplify-and-
forward (AF) relaying networks. Explicitly, we first formulate
a secrecy rate maximization (SRM) problem, which can be
decomposed into a twin-level optimization problem and solved
by a one-dimensional (1D) search and semidefinite relaxation
(SDR) technique. Then in order to reduce the search complexity,
we formulate an optimization problem based on maximizing the
signal-to-leakage-AN-noise-ratio (Max-SLANR) criterion, and
transform it into a SDR problem. Additionally, the relaxation
is proved to be tight according to the classic Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions. Finally, to reduce the computational
complexity, a successive convex approximation (SCA) scheme
is proposed to find a near-optimal solution. The complexity of
the SCA scheme is much lower than that of the SRM and the
Max-SLANR schemes. Simulation results demonstrate that the
performance of the SCA scheme is very close to that of the SRM
scheme in terms of its secrecy rate and bit error rate (BER), but
much better than that of the zero forcing (ZF) scheme.
Index Terms—Directional modulation, simultaneous wireless
information and power transfer, AF, artificial noise, secrecy rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
The past decade has witnessed the rapid development of
Internet of Things (IoT). It is forecast that by 2025 about
30 billion IoT devices will be used worldwide [1], [2]. As
conventional battery is not convenient for such a huge num-
ber of devices, simultaneous wireless information and power
transfer (SWIPT) is recognized as a promising technology
to prolong the operation time of wireless devices [3]–[14].
The separated information receiver (IR) and energy receiver
(ER) are considered in [3]–[5]. The authors in [3], [15] con-
sidered a multi-user wireless information and power transfer
system, where the beamforming vector was designed by the
zero-forcing (ZF) algorithm and updated by maximizing the
energy harvested. In [4], the optimal beamforming scheme
was proposed for achieving the maximum secrecy rate, while
meeting the minimum energy requirement at the ER. In [5],
[16], the authors designed the robust information and energy
beamforming vectors for maximizing the energy harvested by
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the ER under specific constraints on the signal-to-interference
plus noise ratio (SINR) at the IR. A power splitting (PS)
scheme was utilized to divide the received signal into two
parts in order to simultaneously harvest energy and to decode
information [6], [7], [9], [10]. The authors of [11], [12]
investigated both PS and time switching (TS) schemes and
compared the performance of these two schemes.
As an important technique of expanding the coverage of
networks, relaying can also beneficially enhance the com-
munication security, whilst simultaneously enhancing energy
harvesting [17]–[21]. For the case of perfect channel state in-
formation (CSI) situations, secure SWIPT invoked in relaying
networks has been investigated [22]–[24]. Literature [22], pro-
posed a constrained concave convex procedure (CCCP)-based
iterative algorithm for designing the beamforming vector of
multi-antenna aided non-regenerative relay networks. While in
[23], the analytical expressions of the ergodic secrecy capacity
were derived separately based on TS, PS and on ideal relaying
protocols. The beamforming vectors of SWIPT were designed
for amplify and forward (AF) two-way relay networks through
a sequential parametric convex approximation (SPCA)-based
iterative algorithm to find its locally optimal solution in [24].
By contrast, for the imperfect CSI scenarios, the channel
estimation uncertainty model was considered [25]–[29]. In
[25]–[27], the robust information beamformer and artificial
noise (AN) covariance matrix were designed with the objective
of maximizing the secrecy rate under the constraint of a certain
maximum transmit power. The secrecy rate maximization
(SRM) problem was a non-convex problem in [25]–[27], the
critical process is, how to transform it into a tractable convex
optimization problem by using the S-Procedure. In [28] and
[29], the authors formulate the power minimization problem
under a specific secrecy rate constraint and minimum energy
requirement at the energy harvester (EH), which was solved in
a similar manner. In general, for the imperfect CSI situations,
the channel estimation error is usually modeled obeying the
ellipsoid bound constraint, and then be transformed into a
convex constraint by using the S-procedure.
Recently, a promising physical layer security technique,
known as directional modulation (DM), has attracted a lot
of attention. In contrast to conventional information beam-
forming techniques, DM has the ability to directly transmit
the confidential messages in desired directions to guarantee
the security of information transmission, while distorting the
signals leaking out in other directions [30]–[34]. In [30], the
authors proposed a DM technique that employed a phased
array to generate the modulation. By controlling the phase
shift for each array element, the magnitude and phase of each
2symbol can be adjusted in the desired direction. The authors in
[31] proposed a method of orthogonal vectors and introduced
the concept of AN into DM systems and synthesis. Since the
AN contaminates the undesired receiver, the security of the
DM systems is greatly improved. Subsequently, the orthogonal
vector method was applied to the synthesis of multi-beam DM
systems [32]. The proposed methods in [31] and [32] achieve
better performance at the perfect direction angle, but it is
very sensitive to the estimation error of the direction angle.
The authors in [33] modeled the error of angle estimation as
uniform distribution and proposed a robust synthesis method
for the DM system to reduce the effect of estimation error. In
[34], the authors also considered the estimation error of the
direction angle and proposed a robust beamforming scheme in
the DM broadcast scenario.
However, none of these contributions consider DM-based
relaying techniques. For example, if the desired user is beyond
the coverage of the transmitter or there is no direct link be-
tween the transmitter and the desired user, the above methods
are not applicable. Moreover, in [33], [34], the proposed robust
methods only designed the normalized confidential messages
beamforming and AN projection matrix without considering
the power allocation problem. In fact, the power allocation
of confidential messages and AN has a great impact on the
security of DM systems. To the best of our knowledge, there
exists no DM-based scheme considering secure SWIPT, which
thus motivates this work.
To tackle this open problem, we propose a secure SWIPT
scheme based on AF aided DM. Compared to [25]–[29],
instead of channel estimation error modeled obeying the
ellipsoid bound constraint, we model the estimation error of
direction angle as the truncated Gaussian distribution which is
more practical in our DM scenario [34]. The main contribu-
tions of this paper are summarized as follows.
1) We formulate the SRM problem subject to the total
power constraint at an AF relay and to the minimum energy
requirement at the ER. Since the secrecy rate expression is
the difference of two logarithmic functions, it is noncovex
and difficult to tackle directly. Additionally, the estimates
of the eavesdropper directions are usually biased. To solve
this problem and to find the robust information beamforming
matrix as well as the AN covariance matrix, we convert the
original problem into a twin-level optimization problem, which
can be solved by a one-dimensional (1D) search and the classic
semidefinite relaxation (SDR) technique. The 1D search range
is bounded into a feasible interval. Furthermore, the SDR
is proved tight by invoking the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
condition.
2) To reduce the the search complexity, we propose a
suboptimal solution for maximizing the signal-to-leakage-AN-
noise-ratio (Max-SLANR) subject to the total power constraint
of the relay and to the minimum energy required at the ER.
Due to the existence of multiple eavesdroppers, we consider
the sum-power of the confidential messages leaked out to all
the eavesdroppers. This optimization problem is also shown
to be nonconvex, but it can be transformed into a semidefinite
programming (SDP) problem and then solved by the SDR
technique. Its tightness is also quantified. To further reduce the
computational complexity, we propose an algorithm based on
successive convex approximation (SCA). Specifically, we first
formulate the SRM optimization problem and then transform
it into a second-order cone programming (SOCP) which is
finally solved by the SCA method. Furthermore, we analyse
and compare the complexity of the aforementioned three
schemes.
3) The formulated optimization problems include random
variables corresponding to the estimation error of the direction
angles, which makes the optimization problems very difficult
to tackle directly. To facilitate solving this problem, we derive
the analytical expression of the covariance matrix of each
eavesdroppers’ steering vector and substitute it into the opti-
mization problems to replace the random variable. Moveover,
we add relay and energy harvesting node to the DM-based
secure systems, which further expand the application of DM
technology. Simulation results demonstrate that the bit error
rate (BER) performance of all our schemes in the desired
direction is significantly better than that in other directions,
while the BER is poor in the vicinity of the eavesdroppers’
directions, showing the advantages of our DM technology in
the field of physical layer security.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the system model. In Section III, three algorithms
are proposed to design the robust secure beamforming. Section
IV provides our simulation results. while, Section V concludes
the paper.
Notation: Boldface lowercase and uppercase letters repre-
sent vectors and matrices, respectively, A∗, AT , AH , Tr(A),
rank(A), A ≻ 0 and A  0 denote conjugate, transpose,
conjugate transpose, trace, rank, positiveness and semidefinite-
ness of matrix A, respectively, E[·], j, and ‖ · ‖ denote the
statistical expectation, pure imaginary number, and Euclidean
norm, respectively, and ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider AF-aided secure SWIPT,
where the source transmitter sends confidential messages to
an IR with the aid of an AF relay in the presence of an ER
and M eavesdroppers (E1, · · · ,EM ). It is assumed that the
AF relay is equipped with an N -element antenna array, while
all other nodes have a single antenna.
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Fig. 1. System model of secure beamforming with SWIPT based on
directional modulation in AF relaying networks
3Similar to the literature on DM [33], [34], this paper adopts
the free-space path loss model which is practical for some
scenarios such as communication in the air and rural areas. The
steering vector between node a and node b can be expressed
as [31]
h(θab) =
√
gab
1√
N
[
ej2πΨθab (1), · · · , ej2πΨθab (N)
]T
︸ ︷︷ ︸
The normalized steering vector
, (1)
where gab is the path loss between node a and node b. The
function Ψθab(n) can be expressed as
Ψθab(n) , −
(n− (N + 1)/2)l cos θab
λ
, n = 1, . . . , N, (2)
where θab denotes the angle of direction between node a and
node b, l denotes the distance between two adjacent antenna
elements, and λ is the wavelength.
We assume that there is no direct link from the source to
the IR, ER or to any of the eavesdroppers. Thus the relay
helps the source to transmit the confidential message x to IR.
The relay node is assumed to operate in an AF half-duplex
mode. Simultaneously, ER intends to harvest energy, while
the eavesdroppers try to intercept the confidential message.
The power of the signal x is normalized to, E[xxH ] = 1. In
the first time slot, the source transmits the signal x to the relay,
and the signal received at the relay is given by
yr =
√
Psh(θsr)x+ nr, (3)
where Ps is the transmission power of the source, h(θsr)
denotes the steering vector between the source and the relay,
nr ∼ CN (0, σ2rIN ) is a circularly symmetric complex Gaus-
sian (CSCG) noise vector, and θsr is the angle of direction
between the source and the relay. In the second time slot, the
relay amplifies and forwards the received signal to IR. The
signal transmitted from the relay is given by
xr =Wyr + z =
√
PsWh(θsr)x +Wnr + z, (4)
whereW ∈ CN×N is the beamforming matrix, and z ∈ CN×1
is the AN vector assumed to obey a (CSCG) distribution
CN (0,Ω) withΩ  0. In general, the relay has a total transmit
power constraint Pt, therefore we have
Ps‖Wh(θsr)‖2 + σ2rTr(WHW) + Tr(Ω) ≤ Pt. (5)
The signal received at the IR, ER, and the m-th eavesdropper
can be expressed as
yd =h
H(θrd)xr + n0
=
√
Psh
H(θrd)Wh(θsr)x+ h
H(θrd)Wnr
+ hH(θrd)z+ n0, (6)
yp =
√
Psh
H(θrp)Wh(θsr)x+ h
H(θrp)Wnr
+ hH(θrp)z + np, (7)
and
yem =
√
Psh
H(θrem)Wh(θsr)x+ h
H(θrem)Wnr
+ hH(θrem)z+ ne,m ∈ M = [1, 2, ...,M ], (8)
respectively, where h(θrd), h(θrp), and h(θrem) denote the
steering vectors from the relay to IR, ER, and the m-th
eavesdropper respectively. Furthermore, n0, np, and ne rep-
resent the CSCG noise at IR, ER, and the m-th eavesdropper,
respectively, while n0 ∼ CN (0, σ20), np ∼ CN (0, σ2k), and
ne ∼ CN (0, σ2e). Without loss of generality, we assume that
σ2r , σ
2
0 , σ
2
k, and σ
2
e are all equal to σ
2.
Similar to the considerations in [26] and [28], namely that
the perfect CSI of the destination is available at the relay,
here we assume that the relay has the perfect knowledge of
direction angles to the IR. However, there is an estimation error
of the direction angles of eavesdroppers at the relay, and we
assume that the relay has the statistical information about these
estimation errors. Therefore, them-th eavesdropper’s direction
angle to the relay can be modeled as
θrem = θˆrem +∆θrem ,m ∈M, (9)
where θˆrem is the estimate of the m-th eavesdropper’s direc-
tion angle at the relay, and∆θrem denotes the estimation error,
while is assumed to follow a truncated Gaussian distribution
spread over the interval [−∆θmax,∆θmax] with zero mean
and variance σ2θ . The probability density function of ∆θrem
can be expressed as
f (∆θrem) =
 1Ke√2πσθ e
−∆θ2rem
2σ2
θ , −∆θmax ≤ ∆θrem ≤ ∆θmax,
0, otherwise,
(10)
where Ke is the normalization factor defined as
Ke =
∫ ∆θmax
−∆θmax
1√
2πσθ
e
−∆θ2rem
2σ2
θ d(∆θrem). (11)
III. ROBUST SECURE SWIPT DESIGN
In this section, three algorithms are proposed to design
the robust secure beamforming under the assumption that an
estimation error of the direction angles of eavesdroppers exists
at the relay. To design the robust beamforming matrix and AN
covariance matrix, we first define
Hrem , E
[
h(θˆrem +∆θrem)h
H(θˆrem +∆θrem)
]
,m ∈M,
(12)
and Hrem ∈ CN×N . Let Hrem(p, q) denote the p-th row and
q-th column entry of Hrem , and Hrem(p, q) can be written as
Hrem(p, q) = Γ1m(p, q)− jΓ2m(p, q), (13)
where Γ1m and Γ2m can be found in (64) and (67), re-
spectively. The specific derivation procedure is detailed in
Appendix A.
According to (7), the energy harvested at the ER is given
by [35]
E =ρ
[
Ps|hH(θrp)Wh(θsr)|2 + σ2‖WHh(θrp)‖2
+ hH(θrp)Ωh(θrp)
]
, (14)
where 0 < ρ ≤ 1 denotes the energy transfer efficiency of the
ER.
4From (6), the SINR at the IR can be expressed as
SINRd =
Ps|hH(θrd)Wh(θsr)|2
σ2‖WHh(θrd)‖2 + hH(θrd)Ωh(θrd) + σ2 . (15)
According to (8), the m-th eavesdropper’s SINR is given
by
SINRem =
Ps|hH(θrem)Wh(θsr)|2
σ2‖WHh(θrem)‖2 + hH(θrem)Ωh(θrem) + σ2
.
(16)
Thus, the achievable secrecy rate at the IR can be expressed
as [36]
Rs = min
m∈M
1
2
{log2 (1 + SINRd)− E [log2 (1 + SINRem)]},
(17)
where the scaling factor 12 is due to the fact that two time slots
are required to transmit one message. By invoking Jensen’s
inequality, the worst-case secrecy rate is given by
Rs ≥ R¯s =
min
m∈M
1
2
{log2 (1 + SINRd)− log2 (1 + E [SINRem ])}, (18)
where the expectation of the SINRem can be approximated as
[37] [38]
E [SINRem ] ≈ (19)
E[Ps|hH(θrem)Wh(θsr)|2]
E[σ2‖WHh(θrem)‖2] + E[hH(θrem)Ωh(θrem)] + σ2
.
A. Secrecy Rate Maximization based on One-Dimensional
search Scheme (SRM-1D)
In this subsection, the robust information beamforming
matrix W and AN covariance matrix Ω are designed by our
SRM-1D scheme. Specifically, according to (5), (14), and
(17), we maximize the worst-case secrecy rate subject to the
total transmit power and the harvested energy constraints. Then
the optimization problem can be formulated as
(P1) :max
W,Ω
R¯s (20a)
s.t. Ps‖Wh(θsr)‖2 + σ2Tr(WHW) + Tr(Ω) ≤ Pt, (20b)
ρ
[
Ps|hH(θrp)Wh(θsr)|2 + σ2‖WHh(θrp)‖2
+ hH(θrp)Ωh(θrp)
] ≥ Pmin,Ω  0, (20c)
where (20b) denotes total power constraint at the relay, and
the first term in (20c) denotes the minimum power required by
the ER. We employ a 1D search and a SDR-based algorithm to
solve problem (P1). Observe that R¯s is the difference of two
logarithmic functions, which is non-convex and untractable.
Similar to [35], we decompose (20) into two sub-problems,
yielding:
max
β
1
2
log2
(
1 + φ(β)
1 + β
)
s.t. 0 ≤ β ≤ βmax, (21)
and
φ(β) = max
W,Ω
Ps|hH(θrd)Wh(θsr)|2
σ2‖WHh(θrd)‖2 + hH(θrd)Ωh(θrd) + σ2
s.t.
E[Ps|hH(θrem)Wh(θsr)|2]
E[σ2‖WHh(θrem)‖2] + E[hH(θrem)Ωh(θrem)] + σ2
≤ β,m ∈M,
(20b), (20c), (22)
where β is a slack variable. The main steps to solve the
problem (P1) are as follows. First, for each β inside the
interval [0, βmax], we can obtain a corresponding φ(β) by
solving the problem (22). Second, upon substituting β and
φ(β) into the objective function of (21), we obtain the secrecy
rate corresponding to the given β. Thirdly, we perform a 1D
search for β, compare all the secrecy rates obtained and then
finally we find the optimal value for (21).
As for the above procedure of solving the problem (P1), the
most important and complex part is to solve the problem (22)
to obtain φ(β). This are illustrated as follows. Upon defining
w , vec(W) ∈ CN2×1, we can rewrite (22) as
φ(β) = max
w,Ω
Psw
HA1w
σ2wHA2w + hH(θrd)Ωh(θrd) + σ2
, (23a)
s.t.
Psw
HB1mw
σ2wHB2mw +Tr(HremΩ) + σ
2
≤ β,m ∈M, (23b)
Psw
HC1w + σ
2wHw+ Tr(Ω) ≤ Pt, (23c)
Psw
HD1w + σ
2wHD2w+ h
H(θrp)Ωh(θrp)
≥ Pmin
ρ
, Ω  0, (23d)
where
A1 =
[
h∗(θsr)hT (θsr)
]⊗ [h(θrd)hH(θrd)] , (24a)
A2 =IN ⊗
[
h(θrd)h
H(θrd)
]
, (24b)
B1m =
[
h∗(θsr)hT (θsr)
]⊗ (Hrem) ,m ∈ M, (24c)
B2m =IN ⊗ (Hrem) ,m ∈M, (24d)
C1 =
[
h∗(θsr)hT (θsr)
]⊗ IN , (24e)
D1 =
[
h∗(θsr)hT (θsr)
]⊗ [h(θrp)hH(θrp)] , (24f)
D2 =IN ⊗
[
h(θrp)h
H(θrp)
]
. (24g)
With the above vectorization, we show problem (23) can
be transformed into a standard SDP problem. Upon defining
W˜ , wwH ∈ CN2×N2 , (23) can be rewritten as
φ(β) = max
W˜,Ω
PsTr(A1W˜)
σ2Tr(A2W˜) + hH(θrd)Ωh(θrd) + σ2
(25a)
s.t. PsTr(B1mW˜)− βσ2Tr(B2mW˜)− βTr(HremΩ)
− βσ2 ≤ 0,m ∈M, (25b)
PsTr(C1W˜) + σ
2Tr(W˜) + Tr(Ω) ≤ Pt, (25c)
PsTr(D1W˜) + σ
2Tr(D2W˜) + h
H(θrp)Ωh(θrp)
≥ Pmin
ρ
, (25d)
rank(W˜) = 1,W˜  0,Ω  0. (25e)
5Note that the rank constraint in (25e) is non-convex. By
dropping the rank-one constraint in (25e), the SDR of problem
(25) can be expressed as
φ(β) =max
W˜,Ω
PsTr(A1W˜)
σ2Tr(A2W˜) + hH(θrd)Ωh(θrd) + σ2
s.t. (25b), (25c), (25d),W˜  0,Ω  0. (26)
It can be observed that (26) constitutes a quasi-convex prob-
lem, which can be transformed into a convex optimization
problem by using the Charnes-Cooper transformation [39].
Upon introducing slack variable τ , problem (26) can be
equivalently rewritten as
φ(β) = max
Q,Υ,τ
PsTr(A1Q)
s.t. PsTr(B1mQ)− βσ2Tr(B2mQ)− βTr(H¯remΥ)
− βσ2τ ≤ 0,m ∈M,
PsTr(C1Q) + σ
2Tr(Q) + Tr(Υ) ≤ Ptτ,
σ2Tr(A2Q) + h
H(θrd)Υh(θrd) + σ
2τ = 1,
PsTr(D1Q) + σ
2Tr(D2Q) + h
H(θrp)Υh(θrp)
≥ Pminτ
ρ
,Q  0,Υ  0, τ > 0, (27)
where Q = W˜τ and Υ = Ωτ . Since problem (27) is a
standard SDP problem [40], its optimal solution can be found
by using SDP solvers, such as CVX. If the optimal solution
of problem (27) is (Q⋆,Υ⋆, τ), then (Q⋆/τ,Υ⋆/τ) will be
the optimal solution of problem (26).
Since we have dropped the rank-one constraint in the
problem (25) and reformulated it as a SDR problem (26),
the optimal solution of (26) may not be rank-one and thus
the optimal objective value of (26) generally serves an upper
bound of (25). Next, we show that the above SDR is in fact
tight. We consider the power minimization problem as follows
min
W˜,Ω
PsTr(C1W˜) + σ
2Tr(W˜)
s.t.
PsTr(A1W˜)
σ2Tr(A2W˜) + hH(θrd)Ωh(θrd) + σ2
≥ φ(β),
(25b), (25c), (25d),W˜  0,Ω  0, (28)
where φ(β) is the optimal value of problem (26). Observe
that the optimal solution of problem (28) is also an optimal
solution of (26). The proof is similar to that in [41] and thus
omitted here for brevity. In order to obtain the optimal solution
of (25), we should first obtain the optimal solution (W˜⋆,Ω⋆)
and the optimal value φ(β) of problem (26) by solving (27).
If rank(W˜⋆) = 1, then we get the optimal solution of (25).
Otherwise, the rank-one solution can be found by solving (28).
Lemma 1: The optimal solution W˜⋆ in (28) satisfies
rank(W˜⋆) = 1.
Proof : See Appendix B.
Since W˜⋆ is a rank-one matrix, we can write W˜⋆ =
w⋆w⋆H by using eigenvalue decomposition. Thus, the SDR
is tight and the optimal solution of (23) is w⋆ and Ω⋆. Up to
now, we have solved the problem (22).
Let us now return to the procedure used for the problem
(21). The maximum of β should be found by a 1D search.
According to the fact that the secrecy rate is always higher
than or equal to zero, we get
β ≤ Psw
HA1w
σ2wHA2w+ hH(θrd)Ωh(θrd) + σ2
≤ Psw
HA1w
σ2wHA2w+ σ2
. (29)
From the transmit power constraint in (23), we have
σ2
Pt
wHw ≤ 1, hence
β ≤ Psw
HA1w
σ2wHA2w+
σ4
Pt
wHw
=
Psw
HA1w
wH(σ2A2 +
σ4
Pt
IN2)w
.
(30)
Observe that A1 can be recast as
A1 = [h
∗(θsr)⊗ h(θrd)]
[
hT (θsr)⊗ hH(θrd)
]
= a1a
H
1 ,
(31)
where a1 ∈ CN2×1. Therefore, we have rank(A1) = 1.
According to (30) and (31), the upper bound of β is given by
β ≤ PsaH1 (σ2A2 +
σ4
Pt
IN2)
−1a1 = βmax. (32)
The proposed SRM-1D scheme is summarized in Algorithm
1.
Algorithm 1 Maximize secrecy rate based on 1D search
Initialize ε, n, β, and compute βmax.
repeat
1) Set n = n+ 1, β = β + ε.
2) Solve problem (27) and obtain the optimal solution
(Q˜⋆(n),Υ⋆(n), τ⋆(n)) and optimal value φ(β)(n).
3) Compute secrecy rate Rs(n) according to the objective
function of (21).
until β > βmax.
• n = argmax
n
Rs(n), and W˜⋆ = Q⋆(n)/τ⋆(n),
Ω⋆ = Υ˜⋆(n)/τ⋆(n). If rank(W˜⋆)=1, then go to next step;
otherwise, solve (28).
• By using eigenvalue decomposition, we can obtain w⋆,
and reconstruct W⋆; z = Ω⋆
1
2v and v ∼ CN (0, IN ).
return W⋆ and z⋆.
B. Maximization of Signal-to-Leakage-AN-Noise-Ratio (Max-
SLANR) Scheme
In the previous subsection, we employed a 1D search and
a SDR-based algorithm to solve problem (P1). Although we
have already derived βmax, to limit the range of the 1D search,
the complexity of the 1D search still remains high since for
each β, a SDP with O(N13) needs to be solved. In order
to avoid employing the 1D search, we propose an alternative
algorithm for the suboptimal solution of (P1). Specifically, we
propose an algorithm to maximize the SLANR rather than
secrecy rate, subject to the total power and to the harvested
energy constraints. Based on the concept of leakage [42], from
(6) and (8), the optimization problem (P1) can be reformulated
as (33) at the top of the next page. The numerator of the
6max
W,Ω
Ps|hH(θrd)Wh(θsr)|2∑M
m=1 E[Ps|hH(θrem)Wh(θsr)|2] + hH(θrd)Ωh(θrd) + σ2‖WHh(θrd)‖2 + σ2
s.t. Ps‖Wh(θsr)‖2 + σ2Tr(WHW) + Tr(Ω) ≤ Pt,
Ps|hH(θrp)Wh(θsr)|2 + σ2‖WHh(θrp)‖2 + hH(θrp)Ωh(θrp) ≥ Pmin
ρ
,Ω  0. (33)
max
W˜,Ω
PsTr(A1W˜)∑M
m=1 PsTr(B1mW˜) + h
H(θrd)Ωh(θrd) + σ2Tr(A2W˜) + σ2
s.t. PsTr(C1W˜) + σ
2Tr(W˜) + Tr(Ω) ≤ Pt,
PsTr(D1W˜) + σ
2Tr(D2W˜) + h
H(θrp)Ωh(θrp) ≥ Pmin
ρ
,W˜  0,Ω  0. (34)
objective function in (33) represents the received confidential
message power at the IR, and the first term in the denominator
denotes the sum of confidential message power leaked to all
eavesdroppers.
Following similar steps as in Section III-A and dropping
the rank-one constraint, the related SDR problem can be
formulated as show in (34) at the top of the page, where
W˜ = wwH ∈ CN2×N2 and w = vec(W) ∈ CN2×1. Note
that all constraints in (34) are convex. However, the objective
function is a linear fractional function, which is quasi-convex.
Similar to (26), we transform (34) into a convex optimization
problem by using the Charnes-Cooper transformation [39].
Problem (34) can then be equivalently rewritten as
max
Q,Υ,τ
PsTr(A1Q)
s.t.
M∑
m=1
PsTr(B1mQ) + h
H(θrd)Υh(θrd)+
σ2Tr(A2Q) + σ
2τ = 1,
PsTr(C1Q) + σ
2Tr(Q) + Tr(Υ) ≤ Ptτ,
PsTr(D1Q) + σ
2Tr(D2Q) + h
H(θrp)Υh(θrp)
≥ Pminτ
ρ
,Q  0,Υ  0, τ > 0, (35)
where τ is a slack variable, Q = W˜τ and Υ = Ωτ . To prove
that the relaxation is tight, we consider the associated power
minimization problem, which is similar to that in Section
III-A, yielding
min
W˜,Ω
PsTr(C1W˜) + σ
2Tr(W˜)
s.t. − PsTr(A1W˜) + φ
M∑
m=1
PsTr(B1mW˜)+
φhH(θrd)Ωh(θrd) + φσ
2Tr(A2W˜) + φσ
2 ≤ 0,
PsTr(C1W˜) + σ
2Tr(W˜) + Tr(Ω) ≤ Pt,
PsTr(D1W˜) + σ
2Tr(D2W˜) + h
H(θrp)Ωh(θrp)
≥ Pmin
ρ
,Ω  0,W˜  0, (36)
where φ is the optimal value of (35). Problem (36) is a
standard SDP problem.
Lemma 2: The optimal solution W˜⋆ in (36) satisfies
rank(W˜⋆) = 1.
Proof : See Appendix C.
C. Low-complexity SCA Scheme
In the III-A and III-B, we have proposed the SRM-1D and
the Max-SLANR schemes to obtain the information beam-
forming matrix and the AN covariance matrix. Both of the two
schemes have high computational complexity because their op-
timization variables are matrices. To facilitate implementation
in practice, we propose a low complexity scheme based on
SCA in this subsection. Specifically, we first formulate the
optimization problem, then convert it into the SOCP problem,
and use the SCA method to solve the problem iteratively.
Different from designing the AN covariance matrix Ω in the
previous two subsections, here we are devoted to designing
the AN beamforming vector v, where Ω = vvH .
The optimization problem (20) can be rewritten as
max
w,v
min
m
1 + SINRd
1 + E[SINRem ]
(37a)
s.t. wH(PsC1 + σ
2IN2)w + v
Hv ≤ Pt, (37b)
wH(PsD1 + σ
2D2)w + v
Hh(θrp)h
H(θrp)v ≥ Pmin
ρ
,
(37c)
where SINRd and E[SINRem ] are defined in (23a) and (23b),
respectively. By introducing slack variables r1 and r2, problem
(37) is equivalently rewritten as
max
w,v,r1,r2
r1r2 (38a)
s.t. 1 + SINRd ≥ r1, (38b)
1 + E[SINRem ] ≤
1
r2
, m ∈M, (38c)
(37b), (37c). (38d)
7(38b) and (38c) can be rearranged as
σ2wHA2w+ v
Hh(θrd)h
H(θrd)v + σ
2 ≤ Psw
HA1w
r1 − 1 ,
(39a)
wH(PsB1m + σ
2B2m)w + v
HHremv + σ
2
≤ 1
r2
(σ2wHB2mw + v
HHremv + σ
2),m ∈M, (39b)
respectively. Since the quadratic-over-linear function is convex
[40], the right-hand-side (RHS) of (39a) and (39b) are convex
functions (r1 > 1, r2 > 0). In the following, we first transform
the (39a) and (39b) into convex constraints by using the first-
order Talyor expansions [43], and then convert them into the
second-order cone (SOC) constraints. To this end, we define
fA,a(x, r) =
xHAx
r − a , (40)
where A  0 and r > a. We perform a first-order Taylor
expansion on (40) at point (x˜, r˜) [22], yielding:
fA,a(x, r) ≥FA,a(x, r, x˜, r˜)
=
2Re{x˜HAx}
r˜ − a −
x˜HAx˜
(r˜ − a)2 (r − a), (41)
where the inequality holds due to the convexity of fA,a(x, r)
with respect to x and r. Therefore, (39a) and (39b) can be
rewritten as
σ2wHA2w + v
Hh(θrd)h
H(θrd)v + σ
2
≤ PsFA1,1(w, r1, w˜, r˜1), (42a)
wH(PsB1m + σ
2B2m)w + v
HHremv + σ
2 ≤ Fm,
m ∈ M, (42b)
which can be transformed into the SOC constraints, i.e.,∥∥∥[2σA 122w; 2hH(θrd)v; 2σ;PsFA1,1(w, r1, w˜, r˜1)− 1]∥∥∥
≤ PsFA1,1(w, r1, w˜, r˜1) + 1, (43a)∥∥∥[2(PsB1m + σ2B2m) 12w; 2H 12remv; 2σ;Fm − 1]∥∥∥
≤ Fm + 1, m ∈ M, (43b)
where Fm is defined as
Fm =σ
2FB2m ,0(w, r2, w˜, r˜2) + FHrem ,0(v, r2, v˜, r˜2)
+ σ2
(
2
r˜2
− r2
r˜22
)
. (44)
It is easy to see that the objective function of the problem
(38) is non-concave and the constraint (37c) is non-convex.
To handle the non-concave objective function, we introduce
slack variables t and ψ and then rewrite the problem (38) as
max
w,v,r1,r2,t,ψ
t (45a)
s.t. r1r2 ≥ ψ2, ψ2 ≥ t, . (45b)
(43a), (43b), (37b), (37c). (45c)
Note that the first term of the (45b) can be rearranged as the
SOC constraint, i.e.,
‖[r1 − r2; 2ψ]‖ ≤ r1 + r2. (46)
For the second term of the (45b), we employ the first-order
Taylor expansion at the point ψ˜ and transform it into the linear
constraint, i.e.,
2ψ˜ψ − ψ˜2 ≥ t. (47)
In the following, we will focus on dealing with the non-
convex constraint (37c). To convert (37c) into the convex
constraint, we define
uA(x) = x
HAx, (48)
where A  0. Since uA(x) is a convex function, we have the
following inequality
uA(x) ≥ UA(x, x˜) = 2Re(x˜HAx) − x˜HAx˜, (49)
where the inequality (49) holds based on the first-order Taylor
expansion at the point x˜. According to (49), (37c) can be
rewritten as
UG(w, w˜) + UHrp(v, v˜) ≥
Pmin
ρ
, (50)
where G = PsD1 + σ
2D2 and Hrp = h(θrp)h
H(θrp). In
addition, (37b) can be equivalently rewritten as∥∥∥[(PsC1 + σ2IN2) 12w;v]∥∥∥ ≤√Pt. (51)
According to the above transformation of the objective func-
tion and the constraints of problem (37), we can convert (37)
into the following SOCP problem
max
w,v,r1,r2,t,ψ
t
s.t. (46), (47), (50), (51), (43a), (43b). (52)
It can be seen that the optimization problem (52) consists
of a linear objective function and several SOC constraints.
Therefore, problem (52) is a convex optimization problem.
For a given feasible solution (w˜, v˜, r˜1, r˜2, ψ˜), we can solve the
problem (52) by means of convex optimization tools such as
CVX [40]. Based on the idea of SCA, the original optimization
problem (37) can be solved iteratively by solving a series
of convex subproblems (52). The current optimal solution
of the convex subproblem (52) is gradually approaching the
optimal solution of the original problem with the increase of
the number of iterations, until the algorithm converges [44].
Algorithm 2 lists the detailed process of the SCA algorithm.
Algorithm 2 SCA Algorithm for Solving Problem (37)
Initialize: Given a feasible solution (w˜0, v˜0, r˜01 , r˜
0
2 , ψ˜
0);
n=0.
repeat
1. Solve the problem (52) with (w˜n, v˜n, r˜n1 , r˜
n
2 , ψ˜
n) and
obtain the current optimal solution (w˜∗, v˜∗, r˜∗1 , r˜
∗
2 , ψ˜
∗);
n=n+1.
2. Update (w˜n, v˜n, r˜n1 , r˜
n
2 , ψ˜
n)=(w˜∗, v˜∗, r˜∗1 , r˜
∗
2 , ψ˜
∗).
3. Compute secrecy rate R¯ns .
until |R¯ns − R¯n−1s | < δ is met, where δ denotes the
convergence tolerance.
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COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED ALGORITHMS
Algorithms Complexity order
(
suppressing ln( 1
ǫ
)
)
SRM-1D-Robust O
(
nT
√
N2 +N +M + 5
(
N6 +N3 + n(N4 +N2 +M + 5) +M + 5 + n2
))
, where n = O(N4 +N2 + 1).
Max-SLANR-Robust O
(
n
√
N2 +N + 5
(
N6 +N3 + n(N4 +N2 + 5) + 5 + n2
))
, where n = O(N4 +N2 + 1).
SCA-Robust O
(
nL
√
2M + 8
(
(N2 +N)2 + (M + 1)(N2 +N + 1)2 + 6 + 2n+ n2
))
, where n = O(N2 +N + 4).
D. Complexity Analysis
In this section, we analyze and compare the complexity of
the proposed three schemes in the previous three subsections.
For the SRM-1D scheme, we convert the SRM problem to the
SDP form and solve it with an 1D search. The complexity of
each search is calculated according to problem (27). Problem
(27) consists of M + 5 linear constraints with dimension 1,
one LMI constraint of size N2, and one LMI constraint of
size N . The number of decision variables n is on the order
of N4+N2+1. Therefore, the total complexity based on the
SRM-1D scheme can be expressed as [45]
O
(
nT
√
N2 +N +M + 5
(
N6 +N3 + n(N4 +N2+
M + 5) +M + 5 + n2
)
ln (1/ǫ)
)
, (53)
where T denotes the number of iterations in the 1D search
and ǫ denotes the computation accuracy.
For the Max-SLANR scheme, we compute the complexity
of the optimization problem (35), which consists of one LMI
constraint with size of N2, one LMI constraint with size of N
and five linear constraints. The number of decision variables n
is on the order of N4+N2+1. Therefore, the total complexity
based on the Max-SLANR scheme can be expressed as
O
(
n
√
N2 +N + 5
(
N6 +N3 + n(N4 +N2 + 5)
+ 5 + n2
)
ln (1/ǫ)
)
, (54)
For the proposed SCA scheme, we first formulate the SRM
problem, then convert it into the SOCP form, and use the
SCA algorithm to solve it iteratively. The complexity of each
iteration is calculated according to problem (52). Problem
(52) includes two linear constraints, one SOC constraint of
dimension 2, one SOC constraint of dimension N2+N , M+1
SOC constraints of dimension N2 + N + 1. The number of
decision variables n is on the order of N2+N+4. Therefore,
the total complexity based on the SCA scheme is given by
O
(
nL
√
2M + 8
(
(N2 +N)2 + (M + 1)(N2 +N + 1)2
+ 6 + 2n+ n2
)
ln (1/ǫ)
)
, (55)
where L is the number of iterations. The complexity of the
proposed algorithms are also listed in Table I at the top the
page.
Discussions: Upon comparing (53), (54) and (55), it can
be observed that the complexity of the SCA algorithm is
much lower than that of the SRM-1D and the Max-SLANR
schemes. The complexity of Max-SLANR scheme is slightly
less than that of the SRM-1D scheme, but the SLANR scheme
does not require 1D search. Moreover, the complexity of the
SRM-1D scheme grows linearly upon increasing the precision
of the 1D search, with the number of iterations T , and
it grows with the number M of eavesdroppers, while the
complexity of the Max-SLANR scheme is not related to either
of them. This implies that when the number of eavesdroppers
increases, the complexity of the Max-SLANR scheme remains
constant, while the complexity of the SRM-1D and SCA
schemes increases. For example, for a system with N = 6,
M = 2, T = 12 and L = 6, the complexity of the SRM-
1D, the Max-SLANR, and SCA schemes, are O(3.98×1011),
O(3.25 × 1010), and O(8.87 × 106), respectively. Therefore,
the complexity of the SCA scheme is much lower than that of
the other two schemes.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
TABLE II
SIMULATION PARAMETER
Parameters Values
The transmit power at the relay (Pt) 30dBm
The transmit power at the source (Ps) 30dBm
the noise variance (σ2) −10dBm
The number of transmit antennas at the relay (N ) 6
The number of eavesdroppers (M ) 2
the minimum energy required by the ER (Pmin) 10dBm
The maximum angle estimation error (△θmax) 6◦
The normalization factor (Ke) 0.9
The energy transfer efficiency (ρ) 0.8
The direction angle of the source (θsr) − 7π
18
The direction angle of the IR (θrd)
π
2
The direction angle of the eavesdroppers (θre1 , θre2 )
π
3
, 11π
18
The convergence tolerance (δ) 10−4
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our SRM-
1D, Max-SLANR, and SCA schemes by Monte Carlo simu-
lations. Furthermore, we develop a method based on ZF [25]
to show the superiority of our schemes. Additionally, since
in our proposed scheme, we take into account the estimation
error of the direction angles of the eavesdroppers at the relay,
we also consider the scenario relying on perfect estimation of
the direction angle of eavesdroppers from the relay to arrive
at a performance upper-bound of our schemes.
In the following, we denote by ‘SRM-1D-Perfect’ and
‘SRM-1D-Robust’ the SRM-1D method with perfect and
imperfect knowledge of the direction angles from the re-
lay to the eavesdroppers, respectively, and represent by
‘SCA-Robust’ and ‘Max-SLANR-Robust’ our SCA and Max-
SLANR schemes, respectively, when takeing into considera-
tion the estimation error of direction angles at the relay. The
9simulation parameters are listed in Table II, unless otherwise
stated. The free-space path loss model used is defined as
gmn =
(
dmn
d0
)−2
, (56)
where gmn and dmn denote the path loss and distance between
node m and node n, while d0 is the reference distance, which
is set to 10m. The distances from relay to other nodes (source,
IR, ER and eavesdroppers) are assumed to be the same, which
are set to 80 meters, i.e., gmn =
1
64 . The direction angle of
the source, IR, ER and eavesdroppers are θsr = − 7π18 , θrd =
π
2 , θrp =
π
4 and {θre1 , θre2} = {π3 , 11π18 }, respectively. The
location of the source, relay, IR, ER and eavesdroppers in the
Cartesian coordinate system is shown in Fig. 2.
IR
1E
2E
ER
R
S
x
y
80m
Fig. 2. The location of source, relay, IR, ER and eavesdroppers.
25 26 27 28 29 30
P
t
(dBm)
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
3.2
S
ec
re
cy
 r
a
te
(b
it
s/
s/
H
z)
SRM-Perfect
SRM-Robust
SCA-Robust
Max-SLANR-Robust
ZF
28
2.6
2.62
Fig. 3. Secrecy rate versus the transmit power at relay for N = 6, M = 2,
Ps = 30dBm, Pmin = 5dBm, ∆θmax = 6
◦.
In Fig. 3, we show the secrecy rate versus the total power
Pt at the relay. First, it can be observed that the secrecy rate
grows upon increasing the transmit power Pt at the relay for all
cases. Second, compared to other schemes, SRM-1D-Perfect
scheme has the best secrecy rate, because it has perfectly
obtain the eavesdroppers’ directional angle information. Third,
the proposed SRM-1D-Robust slightly outperforms the pro-
posed Max-SLANR-Robust arrangement. For example, when
Pt = 30dBm, the secrecy rate of the Max-SLANR-Robust
scheme is 0.05bits/s/Hz lower than that of the SRM-1D-
Robust scheme. This is because the SRM-1D-Robust scheme
is the optimal solution, while the Max-SLANR-Robust scheme
is a suboptimal solution. Fourth, the secrecy rate of SCA-
Robust scheme is very close to that of the SRM-1D-Robust
scheme. However, the complexity of the SCA-Robust scheme
is much lower than that of the SRM-1D-Robust scheme.
Finally, compared to the ZF scheme, our schemes provide
significant performance improvement.
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Fig. 4. Secrecy rate versus the minimum energy required by the ER for
N = 6, M = 2, Ps = 30dBm, Pt = 30dBm, ∆θmax = 6◦.
Fig. 4 shows the secrecy rate versus the minimum energy
required by the ER for N = 6, Ps = 30dBm, Pt = 30dBm,
∆θ = 6◦. Naturally, the secrecy rate decreases with the
increase of the minimum energy required by the ER for
all cases. The reason behind this is that the more power is
used for energy harvesting, the less power remains for secure
communication, when the transmit power at the relay is fixed.
Furthermore, when Pmin < 9dBm, it is observed that the
secrecy rate decreases slowly. But when Pmin > 9dBm, the
secrecy rate decreases rapidly. This is because the signal is
transmitted over 80m away from the relay, hence the power
of the signal is only 12dBm due to the path loss. Since the
energy transfer efficiency is ρ = 0.8 and Pmin > 9dBm, the
power of the transmit signal is mainly used for satisfying the
energy harvesting constraint, which results in a rapid reduction
of the secrecy rate for all the schemes.
In Fig. 5, by fixing Pt = 30dBm and Pmin = 10dBm, we
investigate the effect of the maximum angular estimation error
∆θmax of the eavesdroppers on the secrecy rate. The SRM-
1D-Perfect curve remains constant for all ∆θmax values and
outperforms the other schemes due to the perfect knowledge of
the directional angle. With the increase of ∆θmax, the secrecy
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Fig. 5. Secrecy rate versus the maximum estimate error angle for N = 6,
M = 2, Ps = 30dBm, Pt = 30dBm, Pmin = 10dBm.
rates achieved by robust schemes degrades slowly, because the
proposed algorithms have considered the statistical property of
the estimation error. As such, they are robust against the effects
of estimation errors.
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Fig. 6. Secrecy rate versus the location of relay for N = 6, M = 2,
Ps = 30dBm, Pt = 30dBm, Pmin = 10dBm, ∆θmax = 6
◦ .
Fig. 6 shows the secrecy rate versus the location of the
relay. We denote the coordinates of the relay by (xr, yr). In
this simulation, we fix xr to zero and assume that the relay
moves vertically along the y-axis, starting from the origin
towards the IR, while the locations of all the other nodes
are fixed. As the relay moves, it becomes closer to the IR
and farther from the source. We can see from Fig. 6 that
for all the schemes, the secrecy rate increases first and then
decreases. The secrecy rate increases because the received
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) increases as the relay moves to the
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Fig. 7. Secrecy rate versus the number of eavesdroppers for N = 6,
{θre1 , θre2 , θre3 , θre4 , θre5 , θre6} = {π3 , 11π18 , 3π4 , π6 , 2π3 , 4π9 }, Ps =
30dBm, Pt = 30dBm, Pmin = 10dBm, ∆θmax = 6
◦.
IR. The secrecy rate decreases because, as the relay continues
approaching the IR, it is getting farther away from the source
node, which decreases the SNR of the IR. We can observe that
the optimal point is yr = 30m. Moreover, when yr = 60m, it
is observed that the secrecy rates of all schemes converge to
the same points, because when the relay has a low SNR, all
these schemes have a similar secrecy rate performance.
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Fig. 8. The performance of BER versus direction angle for N = 6, M = 2,
Ps = 30dBm, Pt = 25dBm, Pmin = 5dBm, ∆θmax = 6
◦.
Fig. 7 shows the secrecy rate versus the number of eaves-
droppers. As can be seen from the Fig. 7, when M = 2 and
M = 6, the secrecy rate of the proposed algorithm decreases
rapidly. This is because the second and sixth eavesdroppers
are located near the DR. Moreover, when M = 6, the secrecy
rate of the ZF scheme is 0. This is because, the degrees of
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freedom of the relay is 6 (N = 6), whereas the degrees of
freedom at eavesdroppers are 6 when M = 6. Therefore, there
is no degrees of freedom left for the DR.
Fig. 8 studies the bit error rate (BER) versus the direction
angle. We employ quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK)
modulation. As seen from Fig. 8, the BER performance in
the desired direction of 90◦ is significantly better than in other
directions for all cases. Observe from Fig. 8, that in the vicinity
of the two eavesdroppers’ directions, the BER performance is
poor, since the signals in these two directions are contaminated
by the AN. Thus the eavesdroppers cannot successfully receive
the information destined to the IR.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated secure wireless information
and power transfer based on DM in AF relay networks.
Specifically, the robust information beamforming matrix and
the AN covariance matrix were designed based on the SRM-
1D scheme and on the Max-SLANR scheme. To solve the
optimization problem of SRM, we proposed a twin-level
optimization method that includes a 1D search and the SDR
technique. Furthermore, we proposed a suboptimal solution
for the SRM problem, which was based on the Max-SLANR
criterion. Finally, we formulated a SRM problem, which was
transformed into a SOCP problem, and solved by a low-
complexity SCA method. Simulation results show that the
performance of the SCA scheme is very close to that of the
SRM-1D scheme in terms of its secrecy rate and bit error rate
(BER), and compared to the ZF scheme, the SCA scheme
and Max-SLANR schemes provide a significant performance
improvement.
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF Hrem(p, q)
Hrem(p, q) can be expressed as
Hrem(p, q) = E
[
hp(θˆrem +∆θrem)h
H
q (θˆrem +∆θrem)
]
=
grem
N
∫ ∆θmax
−∆θmax
ejαpq cos(θˆrem+∆θrem )f (∆θrem) d(∆θrem)
=
grem
N
∫ ∆θmax
−∆θmax
exp
{
jαpq
(
cos(θˆrem) cos(∆θrem)
− sin(θˆrem) sin(∆θrem)
)}
f (∆θrem) d(∆θrem), (57)
where αpq =
2π(q−p)l
λ
. Assuming ∆θmax is a small value
near zero, we get the following approximate expression using
second-order Taylor expansion
sin(∆θrem) ≈∆θrem
cos(∆θrem) ≈1−
∆θ2rem
2
. (58)
Substituting (58) into (57) yields
Hrem(p, q) = Hˆrem(p, q)
∫ ∆θmax
−∆θmax
e
−jαpq
(
cos(θˆrem )
∆θ2rem
2
+sin(θˆrem )∆θrem
)
f (∆θrem) d(∆θrem)
= Hˆrem(p, q)
∫ ∆θmax
−∆θmax
[
cos
(
ξmp,q
)− j sin (ξmp,q)]
f (∆θrem) d(∆θrem)
= Γ1m(p, q)− jΓ2m(p, q), (59)
where
Hˆrem(p, q) =
grem
N
ejαpq cos(θˆrem ) (60)
represents the p-th row and q-th column entry of
h(θˆrem)h
H(θˆrem), and
ξmp,q = αpq
(
cos(θˆrem)
∆θ2rem
2
+ sin(θˆrem)∆θrem
)
, (61a)
Γ1m(p, q) =
Hˆrem(p, q)
∫ ∆θmax
−∆θmax
cos
(
ξmp,q
)
f (∆θrem) d(∆θrem), (61b)
Γ2m(p, q) =
Hˆrem(p, q)
∫ ∆θmax
−∆θmax
sin
(
ξmp,q
)
f (∆θrem) d(∆θrem). (61c)
Now the task is to derive the analytic expression of Γ1m(p, q)
and Γ2m(p, q). To this end, we first expand the trigonometric
function into the following form
cos
(
ξmp,q
)
= (62)
cos
(
αpq cos(θˆrem)
∆θ2rem
2
+ αpq sin(θˆrem)∆θrem
)
= cos
(
αpq cos(θˆrem)
∆θ2rem
2
)
cos
(
αpq sin(θˆrem)∆θrem
)
− sin
(
αpq cos(θˆrem)
∆θ2rem
2
)
sin
(
αpq sin(θˆrem)∆θrem
)
.
Then using the second-order Taylor series to approximate each
term, we can rewrite (62) as
cos
(
ξmp,q
)
=
(
1− α
2
pq cos
2(θˆrem)∆θ
4
rem
8
)
×(
1− α
2
pq sin
2(θˆrem)∆θ
2
rem
2
)
−
(
αpq cos(θˆrem)
∆θ2rem
2
)(
αpq sin(θˆrem)∆θrem
)
≈
(
1− 1
2
α2pq sin
2(θˆrem)∆θ
2
rem
)
−(
αpq cos(θˆrem)
∆θ2rem
2
)(
αpq sin(θˆrem)∆θrem
)
. (63)
Since the last term in (63) is an odd function with respect
to ∆θrem , hence we have (64) at the top of the next page.
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Γ1m(p, q) ≈ Hˆrem(p, q)
∫ ∆θmax
−∆θmax
(
1− 1
2
α2pq sin
2(θˆrem)∆θ
2
rem
)
f (∆θrem) d(∆θrem)
(a)
=
Hˆrem(p, q)
Kem
(
erf(
∆θmax√
2σθ
)− α2pq sin2(θˆrem)σ2θ
(
1
2
erf(
∆θmax√
2σθ
)− ∆θmax√
2πσθ
e
− 1
2σ2
θ
∆θ2max
))
, (64)
Γ2m(p, q) ≈ Hˆrem(p, q)
∫ ∆θmax
−∆θmax
(
1
2
αpq cos(θˆrem)∆θ
2
rem
)
f (∆θrem) d(∆θrem)
=
Hˆrem(p, q)αpq cos(θˆrem)σ
2
θ
Kem
(
1
2
erf(
∆θmax√
2σθ
)− ∆θmax√
2πσθ
e
− 1
2σ2
θ
∆θ2max
)
. (67)
L(W˜,Ω, µ, νm, η, ζ,S1,S2) =
PsTr(C1W˜) + σ
2Tr(W˜) + µ
(
−PsTr(A1W˜) + σ2φ(β)Tr(A2W˜) + φ(β)hH(θrd)Ωh(θrd) + φ(β)σ2
)
+
M∑
m=1
νm
(
PsTr(B1mW˜)− βσ2Tr(B2mW˜)− βTr(H¯remΩ)− βσ2
)
+ η
(
PsTr(C1W˜) + σ
2Tr(W˜) + Tr(Ω)− Pt
)
− ζ
(
PsTr(D1W˜) + σ
2Tr(D2W˜) + h
H(θrp)Ωh(θrp)− Pmin
ρ
)
− Tr(S1W˜)− Tr(S2Ω). (69)
Note that step (a) in (64) results from the following equation
[46]∫ x
0
t2e−q
2t2dt =
1
2q3
(√
π
2
erf(qx) − qxe−q2x2
)
, (65)
where erf(x) represents the error function defined as
erf(x) =
2√
π
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt. (66)
Using a similar method as above, Γ2m(p, q) can be approxi-
mated as (67) at the top of the page. Combining (59), (64)
and (67), we obtain the analytic expression of Hrem(p, q) and
the proof is completed. 
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The optimization problem (28) can be rewritten as
min
W˜,Ω
PsTr(C1W˜) + σ
2Tr(W˜)
s.t. − PsTr(A1W˜) + σ2φ(β)Tr(A2W˜)+
φ(β)hH(θrd)Ωh(θrd) + φ(β)σ
2 ≤ 0,
(25b), (25c), (25d),W˜  0,Ω  0. (68)
Since the problem (68) satisfies Slater’s constraint qualifica-
tion [40], its objective function and constraints are convex, and
the optimal solution must satisfy KKT conditions. The La-
grangian of (68) is given in (69) at the top of the page, where
µ, νm, η, ζ,S1 and S2 denote the dual variables associated
with the constraint in (68). Let W˜⋆,Ω⋆ be the optimal primal
variables and µ⋆, ν⋆m, η
⋆, ζ⋆,S⋆1,S
⋆
2 be the dual variables. The
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions related to the proof
are given as follows
S⋆1 = PsC1 + σ
2IN2 − µ⋆PsA1 + µ⋆σ2φ(β)A2+
Ps
M∑
m=1
ν⋆mB1m − βσ2
M∑
m=1
ν⋆mB2m + η
⋆PsC1+
η⋆σ2IN2 − ζ⋆PsD1 − ζ⋆σ2D2, (70a)
S⋆2 = µ
⋆φ(β)h(θrd)h
H(θrd)− β
M∑
m=1
ν⋆mHrem+
η⋆IN − ζ⋆h(θrp)hH(θrp), (70b)
S⋆1W˜
⋆ = 0,S⋆2Ω
⋆ = 0,S⋆1  0,S⋆2  0,W˜  0. (70c)
From (70b), we arrive at:(
Psh
∗(θsr)hT (θsr) + σ2IN
)⊗ S⋆2 = µ⋆Psφ(β)A1+
µ⋆σ2φ(β)A2 − βPs
M∑
m=1
ν⋆mB1m − βσ2
M∑
m=1
ν⋆mB2m+
η⋆PsC1 + η
⋆σ2IN2 − ζ⋆PsD1 − ζ⋆σ2D2. (71)
Substituting (71) into (70a), we have
S⋆1 + µ
⋆Ps [φ(β) + 1]A1 = Ξ, (72)
where
Ξ =σ2IN2 + PsC1 + Ps(β + 1)
M∑
m=1
ν⋆mB1m+[
Psh
∗(θsr)hT (θsr) + σ2IN
]⊗ S⋆2. (73)
Let us multiply both sides of (72) by W˜⋆ and substitute the
first term of (70c) into the resultant equation, yielding:
µ⋆Ps (φ(β) + 1)A1W˜
⋆ = ΞW˜⋆. (74)
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Since
(
Psh
∗(θsr)hT (θsr) + σ2IN
)
is a Hermitian positive
definite matrix, and S⋆2  0, according to the fact that [47]
λ(X⊗Y) = {µiγj , µi ∈ λ(X), γj ∈ λ(Y)}, (75)
we have [
Psh
∗(θsr)hT (θsr) + σ2IN
] ⊗ S⋆2  0, (76)
where λ(•) denotes the set of matrix eigenvalues. Upon
observing that the first term in (73) is the identity matrix
and the other three terms are Hermitian semidefinite matrices,
we have Ξ ≻ 0. By exploiting the fact that rank(AB) ≤
min{rank(A), rank(B)}, we obtain
rank(ΞW˜⋆) = rank(W˜⋆) ≤ rank(µ⋆Ps (φ(β) + 1)A1).
(77)
Combining (74) with (77) and considering that A1 is a rank-
one matrix, we conclude that rank(W˜⋆) = 1 for µ⋆ > 0,
rank(W˜⋆) = 0 for µ⋆ = 0. However, W˜⋆ = 0 corre-
sponds to no signal transmission. Hence we can conclude that
rank(W˜⋆) = 1, and the proof is completed. 
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Since the problem (36) satisfies Slater’s constraint qualifi-
cation [40], its objective function and constraints are convex,
and the optimal solution must satisfy KKT conditions. The
Lagrangian associated with the problem (36) is given by
L(W˜,Ω, µ, η, ζ,S1,S2) = PsTr(C1W˜) + σ
2Tr(W˜)
+ µ
(
− PsTr(A1W˜) + φ
M∑
m=1
PsTr(B1mW˜)
+ φhH(θrd)Ωh(θrd) + φσ
2Tr(A2W˜) + φσ
2
)
+ η
(
PsTr(C1W˜) + σ
2Tr(W˜) + Tr(Ω)− Pt
)
− ζ
(
PsTr(D1W˜) + σ
2Tr(D2W˜) + h
H(θrp)Ωh(θrp)
− Pmin
ρ
)
− Tr(S1W˜)− Tr(S1W˜)− Tr(S2Ω), (78)
where µ, η, ζ,S1 and S2 are dual variables associated with
the constraint in (36), while W˜⋆,Ω⋆ are the optimal primal
variables and µ⋆, η⋆, ζ⋆,S⋆1,S
⋆
2 are dual variables. The KKT
conditions that are relevant to the proof are given by
S⋆1 = PsC1 − µ⋆PsA1 + µ⋆φσ2A2 + µ⋆φPs
M∑
m=1
B1m+
σ2IN2 + η
⋆PsC1 + η
⋆σ2IN2 − ζ⋆PsD1 − ζ⋆σ2D2, (79a)
S⋆2 = µ
⋆φh(θrd)h
H(θrd) + η
⋆IN − ζ⋆h(θrp)hH(θrp),
(79b)
S⋆1W˜
⋆ = 0,S⋆2Ω
⋆ = 0,S⋆1  0,S⋆2  0,W˜  0. (79c)
From (79b), we get[
Psh
∗(θsr)hT (θsr) + σ2IN
]⊗ S⋆2 = µ⋆PsφA1+ (80)
µ⋆σ2φA2 + η
⋆PsC1 + η
⋆σ2IN2 − ζ⋆PsD1 − ζ⋆σ2D2.
Substituting (80) into (79a), we have
S⋆1 + µ
⋆Ps (1 + φ)A1 = Ξ, (81)
where
Ξ =σ2IN2 + PsC1 + µ
⋆φPs
M∑
m=1
B1m+[
Psh
∗(θsr)hT (θsr) + σ2IN
]⊗ S⋆2. (82)
It is clear from (82) that Ξ is a Hermitian positive definite
matrix. The remaining steps of the proof are similar to the
Lemma 1 and is omitted here. The proof is completed. 
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